$300,000 invested in the building
Build-out, electrical, HVAC, structural repairs, a roof security camera — a decade of tenant investment in a building he didn't own.
Jerry Hancock has a valid lease. Its first page — Section 2.5, boxed at right — gave him the option to renew for five more years, and he exercised it in writing after the landlord herself invoked it. He was evicted anyway — not for breaking the lease he has, but for refusing to sign a new one he never agreed to: a rewrite that converted the deal to triple-net, cut the term, and stripped his Right of First Refusal. When he wouldn't sign, her law firm went silent for 77 days, refused his rent with a handwritten note, broke a written stipulation to continue a hearing, and locked out a ten-year tenant after a one-minute default hearing. This is the record.
“Tenant shall have the option.” Not the landlord. Renewal was Jerry's election to make — the landlord's consent was never required.
Once the tenant elects to renew, the landlord's sole remaining part under §2.5 is proposing the market rent — itself subject to the tenant's agreement.
The eviction complaint never acknowledges §2.5 — as if the front page of the landlord's own lease did not exist. The correspondence shows her counsel knew of it throughout.
An exercised option needs no new lease. The 16 months of talks were a courtesy — and declining to sign a rewritten deal that removed the tenant's rights is not a default. It is the option working.
In 2015, Jerry Hancock — inventor of flash-frozen nitrogen ice cream — signed a ten-year lease for a historic storefront on Provo's Center Street and turned it into Sub Zero's flagship. For ten years he was, in the landlord's own attorney's words, a good tenant who took good care of the building.
Ten-year term (Jan 1, 2016 – Dec 31, 2025) at $2,500/month. The lease grants the tenant two five-year renewal options (§2.5) and a Right of First Refusal (§22.1) if the landlord ever sells. Remember those two clauses — the right to stay and the right to buy. Everything that follows is about getting them off the table.
Build-out, electrical, HVAC, structural repairs, a roof security camera — a decade of tenant investment in a building he didn't own.
Jerry proposes a public art gallery in the storefront windows; Judy Harding approves it. The relationship is cooperative, even warm, for years.
"You have been a good tenant and she has enjoyed the business relationship."
"She definitely does not want to lose you as a tenant."
Nine months before any deadline, it was the landlord who raised renewal. What followed was sixteen months of negotiation in which Jerry said — in writing, repeatedly — that he wanted to stay, and the landlord's side negotiated as if the tenancy would continue. Because it would.
"You have the option of moving or signing another 5 year lease."
Judy: "What are your thoughts for extending the lease?" Jerry: "Yes we're planning on it." Judy: "That is good to know."
Jerry emails Judy directly, with a same-day confirming text. The intent to renew could not be clearer — or better documented.
These communications capture both sides confirming continued tenancy intent.
The lease's formal 90-day notice date passes while both sides are actively negotiating the renewal the landlord herself initiated. Nobody declares anything lapsed. The talks simply continue — for five more months. Under §2.5 and Utah waiver law (Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67 (Utah 1998)), the option had been exercised by conduct and the landlord had waived strict compliance with the notice formality. The lease is active for ten more years.
Randall Jeffs calls Jerry and says the landlord wants to formalize a new lease. He then asks Jerry — a non-lawyer, the tenant — to draft the document himself. Jerry does so in good faith, producing a proposed 10-year term that he delivers to Judy's attorney the following month.
Two five-year terms, drafted by the tenant at the landlord attorney's own request, delivered to the landlord.
The response converts the lease to triple-net, cuts the term to five years, adds an unlimited personal guaranty — and strips out the tenant's Right of First Refusal. Look at what the rewrite removes: precisely the two rights that stood between the landlord's side and a building free of its tenant — the right to stay and the right to buy — while her side simultaneously maintained there was no intent to sell. Nothing is ever signed, so none of these new terms ever attached. Jerry stood on the lease he had.
"She has agreed to do a ten year term, rather than 5."
The same attorney had written two weeks earlier: "Your points do make good business sense. Switching tenants is expensive."
Then the landlord's law firm simply stopped writing. For 77 straight days — zero emails. Verified by forensic search of both tenant mailboxes, every folder, including spam and trash. The landlord's side would later blame the tenant for the delay.
Gmail records searched via API: from:jeffslawoffice.com after:2026/02/27 before:2026/05/13 in:anywhere → zero messages. The claim that Jerry "blew off the efforts to get a new lease for nearly five months" is refuted by the sender's own empty outbox — and it inverts the law besides. Jerry was never required to negotiate anything. The option had been exercised; the only open term was rent. Sixteen months of talks were a courtesy, and declining to sign a brand-new lease is not a default — it is the option working.
Throughout the silence, the Hancocks keep paying — and the landlord accepts $3,327.15 for four consecutive months at the renewal rate. No check returned. No other amount demanded. No objection of any kind. The landlord's own rent ledger, filed with the court, confirms it.
In a span of four days in May, the same landlord whose family said "we definitely would like you to stay" posted an eviction notice on the shop door — demanding a "holdover" rate that had never once been invoiced.
Check No. 1406 — $3,327.15, memo line "May 2026 rent" — mailed to Judy Harding, exactly as the previous four months' rent had been.
The landlord's firm signs a notice claiming a $7,828.75 arrearage at 150% of rent — a rate never billed, never mentioned while four months of ordinary rent were being accepted. The lease requires notice by personal delivery or certified mail and gives five days to cure; this was posted on the public door with three.
"We definitely would like you to stay and we can definitely work this out."
The termination notice is emailed buried inside an old, unrelated email thread and taped to the store's door. The next day, the landlord's attorney calls the decade-long tenant "unworkable."
"We are not trying to delay this" (May 18). Signed renewal documents delivered to Judy's address (May 21). The tenant never stopped trying to stay.
The May rent check sat somewhere for a month. Then it came back — uncashed, unendorsed — with four handwritten words that undo the entire nonpayment theory: not a dispute over the amount, but a rejection of rent itself.
Thirty-one days after it was written, Check No. 1406 is returned with the note "we do reject any rent." A landlord who refuses tendered rent cannot simultaneously evict for failure to pay it. The claimed arrearage collapses on this fact alone.
Nine days before the check was even returned, the eviction complaint was already on file — built around a lease that does not exist, and served on a sixteen-year-old.
The Complaint cites a "May 1, 2025" lease as the operative agreement. No such lease exists. A forensic search of both tenant mailboxes for March–August 2025 — every folder — found no reference to any such document. Elsewhere, the same Complaint correctly cites the real November 2015 lease, contradicting itself.
The summons is handed to Jerry's sixteen-year-old son at the shop. The constable's own affidavit records that Jerry was home but could not come to the door — he was recovering from a finger amputation and related medical emergency.
Unable to retain counsel on days' notice, Jerry files a pro se Answer with counterclaims — including specific performance of the renewal the landlord negotiated for sixteen months.
Plaintiff's initial disclosures include a rent ledger showing $3,327.15 accepted in January, February, March, and April 2026 — the renewal rate, four months running, before any notice ever issued. Judy Harding is listed as the sole witness.
With a hearing set for June 26, Jerry's newly retained counsel — K. Paul MacArthur and George Chingas of MacArthur Heder & Metler, Provo, Utah — asked opposing counsel to agree to a short continuance. The answer came back in writing: yes. Then the landlord's co-counsel walked into the hearing anyway — and took a default in about sixty seconds.
K. Paul MacArthur and George Chingas of MacArthur Heder & Metler (Provo, Utah; (801) 377-1900) enter the case. Counsel reviews the facts, confers with opposing counsel Randall Jeffs about the pending hearing, and immediately seeks a brief continuance to prepare a proper defense.
"Yes we will stipulate…"
Defense staff reach out the same day to coordinate the joint call to the court. The landlord firm's paralegal never responds.
Relying on the stipulation, no one appears for Jerry. The landlord's co-counsel appears anyway. Per the court's own minutes, the hearing runs from 10:40 to 10:41 — the court grants a 5-day order of restitution and "reserves all other claims." No judgment is entered. That same morning, the landlord firm's paralegal writes: "I wasn't aware I was supposed to be spearheading this. Didn't the hearing already take place?"
A ten-year tenant is ordered out in five days — on the strength of a sixty-second default hearing held in violation of opposing counsel's own written stipulation.
The writ names Jerry Hancock individually — but it was never handed to Jerry. It was left with a shift-lead employee of a corporation that isn't even a party to the case. K. Paul MacArthur and George Chingas (MacArthur Heder & Metler) moved immediately to set it aside.
The writ is left with "Millie," an employee of non-party Sub Zero Franchising, Inc. — not Jerry's agent, not a household member. Jerry learned of the writ from his attorney the evening of July 2 and first saw the papers the morning of July 3.
Filed by K. Paul MacArthur, MacArthur Heder & Metler, the next business day — expedited disposition requested. Grounds: the written stipulation, the appearance taken in violation of it, the absence of any entered judgment, and defective service on a shift-lead employee of a non-party — citing opposing counsel's duty of candor to the court.
Defense invokes Utah Code §78B-6-812(5); the court must set a hearing within ten calendar days.
With lockout imminent and the motion unruled, the defense prepares an emergency stay with a bond offer — asking only that the status quo hold, with the landlord fully secured, until the court can hear the claims it has already reserved. Meanwhile: the equipment, inventory, and records inside the store belong to a corporation that was never sued — beyond the lawful reach of any writ in this action.
With the Motion to Set Aside still unruled, a constable executes the writ and posts a "DO NOT ENTER — criminal trespass" notice on the door of the store Jerry Hancock built over ten years. A decade-long tenancy — renewed under the lease's own first page — ends at the door, before any court has heard the merits of anything. The fight to undo it is already filed.
Section 2.5, page one of the lease: "Tenant shall have the option." Renewal required no landlord approval — her only role was the rent number. Jerry elected to renew in writing; the landlord initiated the renewal nine months early, negotiated sixteen months, agreed in writing to a ten-year term, and accepted four months of renewal-rate rent. Under Utah law, a lessor's waiver excuses strict option formalities (Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67 (Utah 1998)). Nothing new was ever signed — the 2016 lease and its option govern.
May rent was tendered and categorically refused: "we do reject any rent." A landlord cannot refuse rent and then evict for nonpayment.
The Complaint's operative "May 1, 2025 lease" does not exist — forensically verified. The Complaint contradicts itself by also citing the real 2015 lease.
"Yes we will stipulate" — in writing — followed by a default taken at a one-minute hearing at which no judgment was entered and all other claims were reserved.
A summons handed to a sixteen-year-old while the defendant recovered from an amputation; a writ left with a shift-lead employee of a non-party corporation.
Jerry Hancock is the tenant personally. The equipment, inventory, and records belong to Sub Zero Franchising, Inc. — not a party to this lawsuit — beyond the reach of any writ in this action.
The claimed $7,828.75 arrearage rests on a 150% "holdover" rate never once invoiced — computed from the wrong base rent under the lease's own Exhibit C schedule, where specific terms control (Wilburn v. Interstate Elec.).